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The Lomé Convention is an intergovernmental agreement between the fifteen Member States of the European Union and seventy countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries). The future of these Conventions is presently subject to an intense debate. The Fourth Lomé Convention was signed in 1989 and expires in the year 2000. The Convention stipulated that 18 months before expiry negotiations on a new Convention should start between the ACP and the EC.
In preparation for these negotiations the European Commission prepared a discussion document, a so-called 'Green Paper'. In this document the European Commission identified areas that might need changing as well as proposals for considerations. Following this paper, consultations are now being held in all the Member States of the European Community as well as in ACP Member States.
It was in 1992 that the Maastricht Treaty gave a legal underpinning for development policy, that the European Community did not have so far. The competence of the Commission in development co-operation was thus formalised. Consequentially, the follow up agreement of the Lomé Convention would need to fit within stipulations outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. Within the treaty the European development co-operation policy is based on three principles (called: 'the three C's):
These principles set out an approach in which the EC programme should not be treated as just another independent programme - with no clear relationship really with the other 15 Member States' programmes.
While at last the Lomé Convention could become a genuine
part of the European Community, some Member States are now openly
questioning whether European Community aid to the ACP should be
continued. Dissatisfied with the work of the Commission and the
impact European aid has had on developing countries, it is argued
that bilateral programmes are performing better. But in essence
the debate is not about the impact of the programmes. Because,
as will be argued in this article, the discussion on the nature
of the relationship between the Member States and the European
Community in the context of the future of the Lomé Convention
is principally a political one. In this article the relationship
between the Member States and the European Community will be explored
in view of the Green Paper.
European Community development programme, including or excluding
the Member States?
Legally, the European Community development programme can include and exclude the Member States' programmes, depending on the interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty. Strictly speaking the EC programme incorporates the bilateral programmes of the Member States to a certain extent - while the Member States also continue to have their own responsibility in this area of policy. The Maastricht Treaty leaves a lot of room for interpreting the framework in a European setting. In 'Horizon 2000' the European Commission analysed that:
'[t]here is therefore no question of simply concentrating at Community level all the means currently employed by the Community and its Member States. On the contrary, the principle of subsidiarity must govern the analysis undertaken to formulate Community policy and the choice of the degree to which Member States' bilateral policies are integrated into co-ordinated policy.'
The Commission identifies three shortcomings in co-operation at a European level: (i) lack of co-ordination (ii) lack of coherence of development policies in the European Union and (iii) the degree to which Community speaks with one voice, and concludes:
'The degree of integration chosen may vary in line with the need to make good the three shortfalls discussed earlier.'
Such logic leads to the almost tautological argument that if co-ordination is lacking, more co-ordination is required. The fact that the Maastricht Treaty leaves much space for interpretation leads to contradictory definitions of the EC programme. The advocates of more co-ordination and coherence argue that the European Community development programme should include the Member States as in one single programme. In a discussion on this matter, the Dutch Ministry of Development Co-operation stated:
'It is unfortunate that the EU programme is treated as another independent programme, it looks as if there are 16 different programmes in the EU: 15 + 1.'
The underlying controversy of this comment is the question whether the EC programme is just another multilateral programme, resulting from intergovernmental co-operation, or whether it is a multilateral programme that also includes the bilateral programmes. When the question of the identity of the European Community development programme was raised with a representative of one of the permanent delegations in Brussels the position was:
'It would be nice if the relationship between the European Community programme and the Member States was something else than 15 + 1. If there was actually a way in which the three C's could be implemented. But the political reality is that this is not the case. In reality it is 15 + 1. The three C's are not taken seriously.'
This comment would suggest that the common character of the EC programme is not taken seriously by the Member States, although resolutions adopted by the European Council of Ministers are intended to lay the ground for a common approach. They are applicable to the European Commission and to the Member States. However, they are generally not of much value to the Member States. As another representative, who was interviewed, stated:
'I do not think these resolutions are very good. We do not implement them. But we try to get the European Council to adopt our policies.'
This statement illustrates the observation that the Member States pay little attention to the resolutions adopted by the Council. It also portrays the fact that many Member States intend to shape the European Community development programme, but they do not envisage the bilateral programmes to be influenced by Community policy. Co-ordination is, therefore, a one-way stream.
The relationship between the Member States and the European Commission
is complex. While the Member States argue that there is too little
transparency in the European Commission, the Commission complains
that the Member States exercise excessive control, which makes
efficient work impossible. Presently the debate oscillates between
two extremes, on the one hand, the desire for more co-ordination,
coherence and complementarity, and on the other hand, the pressure
to re-nationalise part of the European Community development programmes.
In this discussion the role of the different institutions in exacerbating
these problems are overlooked. While the contention between the
roles of the Commission and the Member States, represented by
the Council, continues there is little scope for a debate on
how the European programme could be enhanced.
Bilateral versus multilateral aid
The criticism on multilateral programmes combined with the call to re-nationalise aid programmes is not new. In 1967 an article was published by T. Balogh which discussed the disadvantages of multilateral programmes over bilateral ones:
'The relative advantages of multilateral and bilateral aid have been debated ever since the initiation of the aid programmes on a systematic basis in the last two decades. The early emphasis on the desirability of multilateral aid has now given way, among many economists, to a growing realization that a major role for bilateral aid is both inevitable and desirable.'
While focusing on the Bretton Woods institutions and UN specialised organisations, the author identified problems in key areas of the work, such as:
Precisely these problem areas are the weaknesses of the present
development programmes, implemented by the European Commission.
It demonstrates that the tension between multilateral and bilateral
is not at all new - and that there are some fundamental problems
that result from the multilateral nature of the programmes.
The origin and expansion of the EC development programme
In order to understand the present nature of the EC programme, it is important to look at its origin, and the reasons why it was established.
The predecessors of the Lomé Conventions were the Yaoundé Conventions, the first of which was signed in 1963, with 18 African states. It re-arranged the access of the French ex-colonies to the European Community. Following the entrance of Great Britain as a member of the EEC in 1973, the Lomé Convention was agreed with the ex-colonies of the UK were included in this agreement. The first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975 with 46 independent states. The focus of these Convention was on trade, to arrange access of particularly raw materials from these countries on the European market.
When Spain and Portugal became member of the European Community in the eighties they called for Europe to step up its support to its ex-colonies in Latin America and Caribbean countries, Cuba in particular. Subsequently also aid to Asia was somewhat increased.
In the 1990s the European Community was confronted with the immense changes in Eastern Europe and - for historical and geographical reasons, particularly Germany pressed the European Community to respond to the needs as demanded by this region. The negotiations between the different parts of Europe on this subject resulted in an increase not only for Eastern Europe as well as for support to Mediterranean countries, requested by the Southern European countries. Additionally the Southern European countries demanded a policy with a much clearer humanitarian objective, while the Scandinavian countries - Finland and Sweden only joined the Community in 1995 - expected development policies to have a clear focus on poverty eradication.
The programmes to regions other than Lomé were developed in the context of the European Community core activities; and financed from the European Community budget. There are numerous other budget lines, which reflect particular wishes at particular times focused at specific policies (women, environment, human rights) or countries. Finally, the Maastricht Treaty moved the European Community development programme into a shared responsibility of the Commission and the Member States.
The way in which the European Community development programme has evolved is cause for great confusion at present. The definition of the European Community development programme, even if the Member States are excluded from the definition, is unclear. The EC development programme is ill-defined. None of the possible criteria, such as a region, objectives, policy sectors, or policy instruments, seem to coherently define what is generally understood as the European Community development programme.
The conclusion is, therefore, that the European Community programme
went through a natural evolution, but became an 'added on' set
up. While, the evolution of the programme was the result of national
foci, it became a 'trade in interests'. The one element that was
probably shared most vigorously by the Member States' efforts
to define the European Community development programme was the
attempt to impose their national interests - in terms of regions
and in terms of policies - on the Union.
The European Community versus the Member States
An analysis of the history of the European Community development programme reveals a key element of European policy making in the area of development co-operation. The objective of the Member States is to influence the European Community in such a way that it reflects national interests as best as possible.
At the same time the Member States express criticisms that the European Community development programme is not very good, and the performance of the European Commission is unsatisfactory. This raises an important question. Why do Member States think that the European Community development programme is not very good if they have created the programme, and even have imposed their national priorities on the European Community development programme.
As outlined above, the European Community development programme has grown tremendously, partly in order to accommodate all the different priorities of the 15 Member States. This lead to some declines in budgets for bilateral programmes, or contributions to other multilateral programmes. Particularly reduction of bilateral programmes for multilateral programmes is often an unpopular measure. Often bilateral programmes can particularly reflect the national priorities. Generally, bilateral programmes also accommodate Member States' interests much more, particularly in commercial areas - through tied aid, formally or informally. This has resulted in complaints by some Member States that the EC programme has expanded too much. It also has generated more pressure on the Commission to ensure that Member States can benefit from the EC programme.
The Member States keep a ceiling on the staff level of the Commission. While the EC programme has expanded, both in terms of budget and in terms of regions, the level of staffing has not grown with it. As a result many staff of the Directorate of Development (DG8), which is concerned with the implementation of the Lomé Convention, have been transferred to other DG's. As a result of the staffing system imposed by the Member States the Commission 's expertise has not evolved with changing priorities either. For instance its capacity in key policy areas of poverty eradication, social policy and sustainable development is lacking - as pointed out by the review of the DAC-Committee or the Discharge of the budget 1995 by the Development Committee of the European Parliament. The Commission is, therefore, not well equipped in key areas of development policy - while many of the Member States are much better equipped in terms of staff level and expertise.
In many Member States various ministries are in charge of different elements of the EC development programme, in terms of budget and in terms of management. This often leads to contradictions in Member States' policies towards the EC programme. This does not allow the Commission to respond in a coherent manner and to build the development programme more consistently. Moreover, within the Commission the responsibility for development co-operation is fragmented and divided between 4 Commissioners as well as 4 Directorate Generals and the EC Humanitarian Office.
The Member States would be expected to address the failings of the Commission. However, while the Member States consistently point out the Commission's weaknesses, the Council has not undertaken any measures directed to resolve this situation.
This leads to the conclusion that it might be in the interest
of the Member States to have a weak EC programme. The Member States
may not have sufficient motivation to improve the state of the
European Community development programme. A possible explanation
for this phenomenon may be that a European Commission that is
actually efficient in carrying out your priorities would compete
with the national programmes. This would in itself create the
argument to put more aid into the centre. Even though the Member
States impose their interests on the EC programme, they do not
have a real incentive to make the EC programme work, because this
might be at the expense of the bilateral programmes. At the same
time the condemnations are useful, because they make national
programmes look superior. This argument leads to the conclusion
that the question on the future of Lomé is not so much
whether or not it would have potentially useful mechanisms for
delivering aid. The central question from an European point of
view is whether the Member States desire a European programme
that has the potential to work.
The Green Paper
The Green Paper on the future of the Lomé Convention does not point out any of these constraints. It makes an attempt to evaluate the impact of the Lomé Conventions. While it addresses failures of the ACP to achieve the objectives set out, it does not evaluate the performance of the EU in implementing the Conventions.
The emerging question is why the Commission decided to offer a panacea of possible proposals in its attempt to open the debate on the future Convention, without addressing its two major constraints caused by (a) the lack of implementing capacity of the Commission and (b) the lack of clarity in the relationship between the European Community development programme and the Member States.
Yet the Green Paper does attempt to offer proposals for the redefinition of the composition of the ACP group. In order to further explore the debate on the future of Lomé in view of the relationship between the European Member States and the European Community development programme it will be necessary to investigate carefully possible reasons for proposing a new composition of the ACP group.
The European Commission document 'Horizon 2000' set out very clearly the principle that the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty would possibly incorporate a revision of the recipient countries of European Community development programme:
'This analysis will be supplemented by a geographical weighting since differences among developing countries and the diversity of the Community's interests mean that each case will require a response tailored to its particular requirements.'
No criteria were specified, and groups of countries were not identified. Neither was it explained how Community's interests might lead to geographic alterations. Subsequently, the Green Paper proposed a change in the composition of the ACP group. The Green Paper offers three choices regarding the composition of the group:
The idea to divide the ACP in regional groups fits well with the overall external policies of the European Community. The European Union has sought to establish regional areas to liberalise trade with all regions so far (often euphemistically called 'free trade areas' - even if most agricultural products are excluded from the free trade arrangements). It is obvious that splitting up the ACP would further diminish their political clout as a group and give them less leverage on negotiations concerning the preferential trade agreements currently established between the ACP and the European Union. It would clearly be in the interest of the European Community and the Member States to differentiate trade arrangements between different regions within the ACP. It would also create greater opportunities to generate competition between regions over EU resources.
The proposal to include the poorest countries into the ACP seems attractive, particularly for those who advocate that the objectives of development aid should be for poverty alleviation. It is only possible to consider this option since the ACP countries are now almost equated with the poorest countries - and could, in a derogatory manner, be labelled 'the club of the poor'. The problem with this option is that it leads to stigmatisation. It would enable that much less financial resources would be allocated for development assistance, since it would imply that development aid would only be directed to the poorest countries. Fourthly it would necessarily lead to exclusion of the countries with a higher GDP from the preferential trade arrangements, whilst they are still heavily dependent upon these preferences, and it may make it more difficult to obtain a waiver for the preferential trade arrangements by the WTO. Finally this option would not be desirable as the coherence between different external policies has always been the most important characteristic of the European Community development programme - particularly towards the ACP. The integration of trade, balance of payments support, structural adjustment and social investment in one programme is an important feature of the Lomé Convention, and a manifestation of the Maastricht concept of 'coherence'. It would not be desirable to have a single programme directed towards poverty eradication, and for other regional programmes not to have this objective. Since this proposal would also lead to a more flexible system of trade preferences it would be clearly in the interest of the European Community and the Member States.
The basic principle of co-operation between the EU and other regions is the 'sovereignty' of the region to decide the composition of the group. This has been one of the major arguments used by the European Commission to allow Burma into the regional co-operation between the EU and the ASEAN. It is, therefore, inappropriate for the Commission to introduce itself a discussion on the regional composition of the ACP - particularly whilst the ACP does not seek any such change.
The main question remains, therefore, why did the European Commission open the debate on this contentious subject? From this analysis it appears that the European Commission did not propose these changes with the intention to improve the Lomé Convention in terms of its contribution to development of the ACP countries. The European Commission has clearly sought to introduce proposals that are in the interest of the Member States in order to gain their support for a future Lomé Convention.
'Partnership 2000' and Political Dialogue
Political dialogue has been a key component of the Lomé Convention and the need for it was also identified in 'Horizon 2000' with the emphasis that:
'[t]his dialogue will be credible only if backed up by action on the part of the industrialized countries, not only in the form of aid but also as regards trade and the establishment of a favourable international economic context.'
It is, therefore incomprehensible that the Green Paper fails to
mention the means for political co-operation between the EU and
ACP, presently arranged through the ACP-Joint Assembly. This unique
political mechanism provides opportunities for political dialogue
between the EU and ACP. At this moment of debate on the future
of Lomé it should clearly be considered carefully how this
process for dialogue between the ACP and the EU could be improved
and made more effective. If not the title of the process regarding
the future of Lomé 'Partnership 2000', does not have any
content.
The ACP, European Community and the Member States
In reality the Green Paper reflects the internal discussions of the European Union, and the need for the Commission to defend its role in the face of the Member States. It does not really address the relationship with the ACP. In part this is because the situation in which the Lomé Convention was established is very different from that of today.
Since the inception of the Lomé Convention the Community's relations with other parts of the world have been focused on building trade relations between regional groups. These are being defined on the basis of regional specificity and the specific interests of the European Union in that region. In this context the ACP's broad scope as one region - geographically, developmentally and economically, no longer fits very easily. Therefore the emphasis given to regional co-operation within Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific is seen much more in terms of the individual elements of the ACP than of the group as a whole. This rationale is important for the Commission as its main negotiation on its future role in relation to Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific is with the European Union Member States and not with the countries of the ACP.
The publication of the Green Paper appears to be motivated first
and foremost by the wish to safeguard the role of the Commission
in the future on development co-operation - by a strategy in which
responding to the interests of Member States have become the primary
objective. The Green Paper does not offer any analysis that puts
the interests of the ACP States as a central issue. The Green
paper is not based on any thorough analysis of the impact that
the Lomé Conventions have had on the development of the
ACP countries. The suggestions offered for consideration in the
Green Paper are not proposed against the benchmark of their expected
effects on the ACP countries.
Should the European Union have a development programme?
The question so far underlying the debate on the future of Lomé appears to be whether the European Commission should have a capacity to implement a European Community programme with ACP countries. Most Member States would be interested in keeping a relatively weak Community programme that can be used whenever it is useful, and which only cover areas that the Member States find difficult to tackle by themselves. This raises the question whether it is in the interest of developing countries to have a European Community development programme.
If the European Community did not implement a development co-operation programme it would have no weight in directing a foreign policy to developing countries that includes development objectives. With the Maastricht Treaty the Common Foreign and Security Policy has become an area of the European Union common policies. The Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) is likely to strengthen the capacity of the European Union in this field. That implies that the European Union does need common approaches to development policies as well. Foreign policies towards developing countries require the instruments offered by development aid in order to provide leverage.
The IGC will also lay the grounds for the future enlargement of the Union. This will lead to the inclusion of Eastern European countries. This region has much less historic links with the ACP countries, and consequentially, will not give similar priority to enhancing relations with the ACP. It is, therefore, in this important historical time, even more important to anchor the relationship with the ACP fully into the programme of the European Union.
It is sometimes suggested that the Commission could negotiate on behalf of the Union, while the Member States would implement the European development programmes. This would resolve some of the present problems in terms of capacity that the European Commission has. This is an impractical solution; the European Commission can not negotiate external policies with the developing countries on behalf of the Union if it does not have the tools to support these policies.
The question should, therefore, not be whether there is at all a need a European Community development programme, but how the European Community development programme can be strengthened. The question is not whether bilateral aid is more effective than multilateral aid or vice versa. The question raised at this stage ought to be how a more effective Community programme could be derived, and how the bilateral programmes can contribute to achieving this. It is crucial that the principles of coherence, co-ordination and complementarity, enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, should form the basis for this debate.
In 1967, having identified all the weaknesses of multilateral aid, Balogh comes to the conclusion that:
'In fact, we need both bilateral and multilateral channels because we need far greater and far more effective action.'
Today, and in the year 2000, this has not changed. In order to implement political decisions regarding external policies of the European Member States, co-ordination of the Member States development programmes is still required. Coherence between different policies of the European Union is still necessary to increase the potential positive effects of development policies for the developing countries. An European external policy requires support by mechanisms that allow a perspective which seeks improvement of developing countries' economies as well as the eradication of poverty. This means that if the European Community did not have a development programme it would in all likelihood be created. The question, therefore, as to whether a European Community development programme should exist, is irrelevant. On the contrary, the European Union does need a common approach to development co-operation.
The crucial question on the future of Lomé is how the Convention can be improved. It is clear that the capacity of the Commission is limited. The Member States, through the European Council, have the possibility to correct this situation.
The debate should, therefore, not focus on the question whether one programme is superfluous in the light of fifteen other programmes. The question to be asked is what can motivate the fifteen Member States' programmes to contribute to a more coherent development policy of the European Union. The notion on which the European Union programme is based needs to be transformed from the concept of '15 + 1' to that of '1+15'.
2. A summit of ACP Head's of State is planned to take place at the end of 1997.
3. Commission of the European Communities, Development Co-operation Policy in the Run-up to 2000, The consequences of the Maastricht Treaty, Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament, SEC(92) 915 final, Brussels, 15 May 1992, (p.14) (called: 'Horizon 2000').
4. ibid.
5. Letter from the Director General of the Ministry of Development Co-operation (DGIS) to the author, Netherlands, July 1996.
6. Interview, 4/3/97.
7. Interview, 7/3/97.v
8. T. Balogh, 'Multilateral v. Bilateral Aid, Excerpts from T. Balogh (1967) 'Multilateral versus bilateral aid', Oxford, Economic Papers, new series, vol. 19, no. 3, PP; 328-30, 332-44, published in : 'Foreign Aid' edit: Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard S. Eckhaus, Penguin modern economics, Middlesex, England (1970) (pp. 201-222).
9. This is illustrated, for instance, by the demand of the Flemish government in Belgium to transfer aid to the regional government, in order to support specific trade interests with South Africa and other countries.
10. OECD, European Community, Development Co-operation Review Series, Development Assistance Committee, 1996, No. 12; Development Committee, Discharge of the 1995 Budget, Glenys Kinnock, Parliament of the European Communities, 1997.
11. Commission of the European Communities, 1992, ibid. (p. 14)
12. EU-ACP joint Assembly, held 19-20 March 1997.
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