External
Action of the European Union
A commentary
on the results of Convention’s Working Group first meeting
The Convention working group on external action (WG VII) held its
first meeting on the 24 and 25 September, beginning its discussions on how
to re-structure the EU’s common external policies. The Working Group was
established to make proposals to the Convention as a whole on how the Union
can work externally in an effective, coherent and consistent way. The
results of the Working Group will be presented to the Convention Plenary
in December.
The report from the meeting states that ‘A common policy could not be an
end in itself but needed to be seen and designed in view of the objectives
the EU aimed at.’ Therefore, ‘the group felt that it was important for the
EU to think first of the objectives of a common policy before discussing
the modalities and institutional aspects.’
Such an approach would seem to be logical, but as was fairly predictable,
the predominant focus of the discussion was around the CFSP since this is
the area of external policy where the most contentious issues lie.
The ‘need to better define the underlying objectives of EU external action’
does not seem to have been taken very far in substantive terms. The proposal
put forward for the EU to adopt a “Declaration of Principles” has potential
merit, but would need to be reflective of the principles covering all aspects
of external policies to ensure that they were had equal status. The
proposals for the fundamental values in this declaration of ‘peace, independence
and solidarity’ would not be adequate in themselves, and promoting ‘independence’
as a fundamental value is perhaps out of place. The notion of ‘fundamental
values’ implies that they are universal in nature, and it is in recognition
of this that the EU’s actions should be derived.
While the Union should of course be an independent actor insofar as this
enables the promotion of fundamental values, the interdependence of the EU
with the rest of the global community also needs to be recognised.
What is more, given the EU’s global economic power, and potential for evolving
into a political world power as well, the responsibility this endows on the
EU to use its position not just to its own advantage but to promote and ensure
the interests of people globally, particularly those living in developing
countries.
It is within this context that the importance of making policy coherent materialise
in a genuine way with objectives derived from these fundamental principals.
Equally, the need for consistency of approaches and actions should be motivated
from the same value base. The working paper by Mr. Lennmarker, who
calls for enhanced market access for developing countries is already seeking
to promote such actions. The EU may be able to act independently, but
it needs to realise that many countries and their inhabitants are dependent
upon it acting responsibly.
Institutional implications
Inevitably the discussion also focused on future responsibilities for the
different institutions, and the relationship between the institutions, and
more emphasis seems to have been given to these issues than the question
of underlying objectives for the EU’s external actions. In the end
the whole debate hinges around how external policy and its implementation
will be controlled and its accountability. Establishing a comprehensive framework
for external actions is clearly seen as desirable, but because of the interests
involved in different external policy area under the same decision-making
procedure would not be realistic. The sensitive nature of foreign and security
policy made several group members doubt that even qualified majority voting,
not to speak of the community method, could be employed in this field. However,
enhanced use of constructive abstention was considered as a path to be followed.
This would imply a ‘split-up external policy framework’ that would effectively
maintain the separation of CFSP and defence from other areas of external
relations. In this case there would be no reason for great changes to take
place in the fields of security and defence. It is clear that these will
almost inevitably remain intergovernmental in their basic nature, even if
there was to be extended use of ‘smoothening mechanisms’ like constructive
abstention.
The major issue revolve around how to increase levels of consistency between
the different external policy areas, and in particularly the role of High
Representative for CFSP and the Commission within the external political
policy. There was great unity in the group around the opinion that the function
of High Representative has been successful, and that the resources for this
must be secured for the future. Furthermore, following the recommendations
of the working group on legal personality, there were proposals to explore
the possibilities for widening the mandate of the HR. This could happen through
closer co-operation with the external relations commissioner or, as the most
radical scenarios suggest, through some kind of fusion of their functions.
There is a real danger of creating further confusion and a lack of clarity
in the institutional structures for managing the different external policies.
The desire to have a more effective single representation, what has been
dubbed a ’single mouth’ can only work where there is greater consistency
between the policies. However, this consistency cannot expect to be
achieved unless there is absolute clarity around institutional responsibilities
for policy determination, and in the accountability for their implementation.
Any proposal that gives a determining role for the High Representative within
the Commission would create such confusion. Whatever the responsibilities
of the High Representative would be within the Commission, s/he would be
principally accountable to the Council. In such circumstances consistency
would be derived by the objectives of the CFSP, and the policies and practices
of other external actions would be determined, first and foremost, by these.
The notion of a common external policy framework might start to emerge, but
with a diminishing role for the Parliament, and even the Commission.
The desire for effective implementation would also raise the questions as
to who, in future, would effectively direct the work of the Community’s delegations.
This would erode the current separation of powers.
Such a result would be retrogressive and therefore other solutions need to
be explored. Even if, as can be expected, the CFSP and defence remain
intergovernmental in nature, the principal objectives of the Union, and any
‘Declaration of Principles’ must encompass the breadth of fundamental values
that apply to all areas of external policies. How these are translated
into policy should be an issue for all the institutions of the Union, including
the Parliament. And there needs to be the means by which the interests
of the different external policy areas, and their representatives, come together
as equals so that consistency in the application of policies can be determined
on the basis of all aspects of the EU’s principal objectives. This
can only be assured jointly by the Commission, Council and Parliament, and
not on the basis of Council alone.
7 October 2002
© Eurostep.
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